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Henry Sidgwick. A Memoir by A. S. and E. M. S. London:
Macmillan & Co., 1906. Pp. 646.
Memoir of Thomas Hill Green, Late Fellow of Balliol College,
Oxford, and Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the Uni-
versity of Oxford. By R. L. NETTLESHIP, with a short Preface
specially written for this edition by Mrs. T. H. Green. Pp. vii,
259. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1906.
THE Memoir of Henry Sidgwick published by his wife and brother
is in the main a personal record, and the pages of MIND are not the
place in which to dwell on the biographical facts of a quiet and un-
eventful life, or even on the beautiful and simple character which the
Memoir partially reveals to those who were not brought within the
charm of his rsunny personality. But a philosophical periodical
may fitly inquire what light these more private records throw upon
the growth of Sidgwick's ideas and the influences which went to shape
his thought. What were the intimate convictions and preoccupying
questions which lay behind his published work and which only oc-
casionally make themselves felt in-the course of its impartial dis-
cussion and carefully measured pronouncements ?
In a short (too short) autobiographical fragment, dictated about a
fortnight before his death, Sidgwick speaks of the central and funda-
mental aim of his life as having been " the solution, or contribution to
the solution, of the deepest problems of human life "; and he adds,
" the peculiarity of my career has been that I have sought light on
these problems, and that not casually but systematically and labori-
ously, from very various sources and by very diverse methods ".
Few, indeed, have ever fulfilled so well Berkeley's injunction to the
philosopher not to be content with " a little ardour in the early time
of life," but to "dedicate his age as well as youth, the later growth
as well as first fruits, at the altar of Truth ". Intense intellectual
curiosity is mentioned as the chief mark of the boy, and an old
friend, writing of him as an undergraduate, puts down as " his first
and supreme characteristic, candour. It seemed to me then, as it
does now, something morally beautiful and surprising; it dominated
and coloured his other great qualities—those of subtlety, memory,
boldness." Every one who knew Sidgwick, every one who has
read his books, will recognise at once the truth of these words.
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Perfect intellectual candour is not without its drawbacks or at
least its besetting dangers, and some may be inclined to sym-
pathise with Leslie Stephen's complaint (in his warm tribute at the
Memorial meeting in Cambridge) that " if possible Sidgwick carried
his love of fair play rather to excess; in his speculations he saw too
completely the force of the opposite side ". Sidgwick himself, in
one of his keen passages of self-analysis, touches the defect as well
as the ciarm of his own quality. " I think," he says in a letter of
1866, " I have more knowledge of what the thoughts of men have
been, and a less conscious faculty of choosing the true and refusing
the false among them. 1 wonder whether I shall remain a boy all
my life in this respect. I do not say this paradoxically, but having
John Grote in my mind, who certainly retained, with the freshness,
the indecisiveness of youth till the day of his death." But there
was something very beautiful in Sidgwick's open-mindedness, in the
freshness of which he speaks, in his unending search for light. At
the meeting already referred to Dr. Gore in a speech of deep feeling
commented on this characteristic—the perpetual hopefulness of his
inquiry. "He always seemed to expect that some new turn of
argument, some new phase of thought, might arise and put a new
aspect upon the intellectual scenery, or give a new weight in the
balance of argument.1 There was in him an extraordinary belief in
following reason—a belief and a hopefulness which continued up to
the last. This is,-1 venture to think, a quality which is exceedingly
rare in our time, for mostly when we have settled down to our posi-
tions, we lose any real hope of obtaining any strikingly new light
on the deepest matters. It was quite otherwise with Sidgwick.
Although, no doubt, you felt that the dominant quality of his mind
was sceptical . . . yet it was profoundly different from ordinary
scepticism; for it was inspired by a fundamental belief in the attain-
ableness of positive truth. At the bottom of his mind was the pro-
found desire to find an adequate basis on which to rest a positive
construction of a worthy life."
When Sidgwick's mind first opened to philosophical questions,
Mill's influence was at its height. " No one thinker, so far as I
know," he says in the autobiographical fragment already quoted,
" has ever had anything like equal influence in the forty years or so
that have elapsed since Mill's domination began to weaken." So
we find him about 1859 or 1860 beginning a systematic study of Mill's
works, acquiring at the same time a mastery of political economy,
and devoting a good deal of thought to practical questions, social and
political. In another passage of reminiscence he describes " the
ideal which became dominant in his mind in the early sixties,"
primarily under Mill's influence, but partly under the influence of
1
 Sidgwick himself refers, in a letter of 1873, to "a peculiar hallucina-
tion under which I labour that I shall suddenly find my ideas cleared up
—say the day after to-morrow—on the subjects over which I brood
heavily " (p. 277).
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"Comte seen through Mill's spectacles " : " It had two aspects,
social and the other philosophical or theological. What we aimed
at from a social point of view was a complete revision of human re-
lations, political, moral, and economic, in the light of science directed
by comprehension and impartial sympathy; and an unsparing re-
form of whatever, in the judgment of science, was pronounced to be-
not conducive to the general happiness. This social science must, of
course, have historical knowledge as a basis; but, being science, it
must regard the unscientific beliefs, moral or political, of past ages
as altogether wrong—at least in respect of the method of their
attainment, and the grounds on which they were accepted. . . . As
regards theology, those with whom I sympathised had no close
agreement in conclusions—their views varied from pure positivism
to the ' Neo-christianity' of the Essayists and Reviewers; and my
own opinions were for many years unsettled and widely fluctuating.
What was fixed and unalterable and accepted by us all was the^
necessity and duty of examining the evidence for historical Christi-
anity with strict scientific impartiality." By way of facing this duty
Sidgwick devoted the greater part of his spare time for about three
years to the study of Arabic and Hebrew literature and history,,
under the conviction that " it was impossible really to understand at
first hand Christianity as a historical religion without penetrating more
deeply the mind of the Hebrews and of the Semitic stock from which
they sprang ". The fact is characteristic of Sidgwick's conscientious
desire, on every question, to do justice to all the evidence. Not less
characteristic is his " secret conviction that the great use of learning
Hebrew is to ascertain how little depends on i t" (p. 89). Before
the beginning of 1865 he had finally abandoned his oriental studies,
and was turning to philosophy as a more direct source of light on
his religious difficulties. As early as 1862 we find him "revolving
a Theory of Ethics ". " I think I see a reconciliation between th&
moral sense and utilitarian theories " (p. 75). In 1864 he has been
setting to work on a book that was to be called ' Eudaemonism
Eestated'. This is, of course, the Methods of Ethics, eventually
published in December, 1874. The different influences which led to
the writing of the book and to the precise formulation of the author's
theory have been detailed by Sidgwick himself in the lecture-sketch
prefixed to the posthumous edition, and the Memoir adds no further
information. It shows Sidgwick, however, wrestling with German
philosophy in 1866 and again in 1870. In 1866 Fichte seems to
him " absolutely devoid of judgment " and he is " coming more and
more U> the opinion that the whole ' Identitiitsphilosophie' (Fichte,
Schelling and Hegel) is a monstrous mistake, and that we must go
back to Kant and begin again from him ". " Not," he adds, " that
I feel prepared to call myself a Kantian, but I shall always look-on
him as one of my teachers." He has parted company with Mill, he
feels, for ever, and he thinks that " the best motto for a true Meta-
physic are those two lines of Shelley:—
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I am the eye with which the Universe
Beholds itself, and knows itself divine ".
This might be claimed as an eminently Hegelian utterance, but it
is not till 1870 that we find him trying to settle accounts with Hegel,
forced thereto, as he candidly says, rather by "a sense of profes-
sional duty than any natural instinct". " Day after day," he writes
from J?orlin in the midst of the Franco-German war, " I sit down
to my books with a firm determination to master the German
Heraclitus, and as regularly I depart to my Mittagsessen with a
sense of hopeless defeat. No difficulty of any other writer can con-
vey the least conception even of the sort of difficulty that I find in
Hegel. My only consolation is that every other sort of philosophi-
cal work I take up seems easy. But no amount of difficulty alone
would distress my spirit, if there was not added the paralysing doubt
whether, after all, I am not breaking my head over highly profound
nonsense." After some weeks of the struggle he records his deter-
mination to read no more of it. " The method seems to me a mis-
take, and therefore the system a ruin; there may be ' gold to be
dug there,' as Carlyle says, but I have no time to dig for it among
the scoriae." And yet the admissions he makes would go far to
satisfy most of those who have learned in Hegel's school. " There
are some great broad truths, independent of the method, and lying
safe at the base of the system ; with Hegel's intense grasp of these
I sympathise strongly, and to it I attribute the success of his philo-
sophy, e.g., generally speaking, the reaction from the formalism,
phenomenalism, ultra-subjectivism of Kant. That the Universe
is essentially and fundamentally rational; the laws of the subject
and the object harmonious; history the evolution of the human
spirit, etc., etc.—all this is well enough. And I do not say that the
science of metaphysics will not ultimately be constructed in the way
that Hegel tried to construct it, by patiently thinking out the mean-
ing of our most general and fundamental notions and their relation to
each other." But though he does this justice to the spirit and in-
tention of the Hegelian philosophy, he had no natural affinity with
its speculative sweep. He describes the system of his own to which
he was feeling his way in 1866 as " founded on a union between
Brown and Hamilton, with an intermixture of Kant and Ferrier ".
" My fundamental position," he writes to Eoden Noel, "is much
what it was in summer—that fundamental dualism which seems to
you so unphilosophical." This dualism reappears in his strictures
on " Mentalism," in his lectures on " Philosophy, its Scope and Ee-
lations " ; and his sympathetic lecture on Reid towards the close of
his life shows that philosophy meant to him very much what it
meant to the Scottish philosophers. His lectures on Kant, incisive
as they are at points in deab'ng with individual arguments and posi-
tions advanced by Kant, make the impression of criticisms from
the outside by one who had never appreciated the central thoughts
of Kant on which Idealism builds.
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To Sidgwick as to Lotze, with whom he had temperamentally a
good deal in cqmmon, the problem of philosophy presented itself as
the " reconcilement of spiritual needs with intellectual principles"
(p. 75). For some years after the difficulties of historical Christi-
anity began to press upon him his mood was in his own phrase that
of one ' hungering and thirsting after orthodoxy'. " I have vowed,"
he writes in 1862, " that it shall not be for want of profound and
devoted study if I do not become a Christian." "But I am firm,"
he adds, " not to barter my intellectual birthright, for a mess of
mystical pottage " (pp. 82 and 90). After a series of oscillations
between Broad Churchism and a vague Theism he was able to say
at the end of 1864 that he had definitely " freed his innermost con-
science from the thraldom of a historical belief," and he never swerved
from this position, although his personal relation to the traditional
faith occupied his thoughts a good deal till the resignation of his Fellow-
ship in 1869. "For many years," he says in 1880, " I have not
thought of Christianity except as the creed of my friends and fellow-
countrymen." But he considered it to the end as an all but indispens-
able support of theistic or optimistic faith for the mass of mankind (pp.
357, 508), specially in view of 'the Christian hope of happy im-
mortality '. Hence his prevailing mood is the one he describes on
the return from a visit to his brother-in-law, Archbishop Benson, at
Addington in 1866 : " I find that I grow more and more, on the one
hand, to regard Christianity as indispensable and irreplaceable—
looking at it from a sociological point of view—and on the other
hand to find it more and more incomprehensible how any one whom
I feel to be really akin to myself in intellectual habits and culture
can possibly find his religion in it". It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that while he considers Christianity indispensable in the pre-
sent state of the world, he is " not prepared to say that this will be
equally true some centuries hence; in fact 1^  see strong ground for
believing that it will not be equally true, since the tendency of develop-
ment has certainly been to make human beings more sympathetic;
and the more sympathetic they become, the more likely it seems
to me that the results of their actions on other human beings (in-
cluding remote posterity) will supply adequate motives to goodness
of conduct, and render the expectation of personal immortality less
important from this point of view" (p. 357, in letter to J. R.
Mozley, 1881). And in a paper on Authority, read> to the Syn-
thetic Society in 1899, one of the last things he wrote, he returns
to the possibility of " untheological morality," that is, morality
unsupported by theological beliefs or unctions. Many would
be inclined to consider the cases which occur of high morality
unsupported by such conditions as purely exceptional, but this
Sidgwick is not prepared to admit. " The difficulty that I find is
in convincing myself that this untheological morality is really ab-
normal, and does not rather represent the beginnings of a more
advanced stage in the development of the moral consciousness. It
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seems to me a tenable view that the development of scientific socio-
logy and of social sentiment in average men tends ultimately to
disconnect morality from its present theological scaffolding, and ex-
hibit it as simply the outcome of social feeling, guided by a rational
forecast of social consequences " (p. 615).
But while Sidgwick had personally discarded Christianity as a
historical system, he clung tenaciously to some form of theistic
belief. n 1862 he defines Theism as the contemplation of " a
Heart and Mind behind phenomena". He finds "no sort of proof
against" this hypothesis and it "answers to a need" of his own
nature, while " the experience of thousands testifies that such con-
templation generates an abiding tV o^utriacr/xds, with all its attend-
ant noblenesses and raptures". In 1870, although he "can neither
adequately rationalise faith, nor reconcile faith and reason, nor
suppress reason," he knows that his "true self is a Theist ". In
1891 he refers to Theism as " the belief that there is a sympathetic
soul of the Universe that intends the welfare of each particular
human being and is guiding all the events of his life for his good,"
and a few years later, in a letter on In Memoriam, after quoting the
concluding stanzas of Section 124, he writes: " These lines I can never
read without tears. I feel in them the indestructible and inalienable
minimum of faith which humanity cannot give up, because it is
necessary for life; and which I know that I, at least so far as the
man in me is deeper than the methodical thinker, cannot give up "
(p. 541). He talks frequently of his " Optimism " and refers once
to his " idealism " which "the cold corrosive scepticism," to which
he is subject as a thinker, is somehow powerless to affect (p. 283).
There can be no doubt, therefore, as to the cast of his personal
Weltanschauung. But when the methodical thinker speaks, and
the question of proof is uppermost, the answer is more balanced.
" If I am asked whether I believe in a God," he writes in 1880, " I
should really have to say that I do not know—that is, I do not
know whether I believe or merely hope that there is a moral order
in this universe that we know, a supreme principle of Wisdom and
Benevolence, guiding all things to good ends, and to the happiness
of the good. I certainly hope that this is so, but I do not think it cap-
able of being ]rroved. All I can say is that no opposed explanation
of the origin of the cosmos—for instance the atomistic explana-
tion—seems to me even plausible, and that I cannot accept life on
<my other terms, or construct a rational system of my own conduct
except on the basis of this faith. . . . Duty is to me as real a thing
as the physical world, though it is not apprehended in the same
way; but all my apparent knowledge of duty falls into chaos if my
belief in the moral government of the world is conceived to be with-
drawn. Well, I cannot reconcile myself to disbelief in duty ; in
fact, if I did, I should feel that the last barrier between me and
complete philosophical scepticism, or disbelief in truth altogether,
was broken down. Therefore I sometimes say to myself ' I believe
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in God ' ; while sometimes again. I can say no more than ' I hope
this belief is true, and I must and will act as if it was' " (pp. 347-48).
All students of Sidgwick are familiar with this position which is
essentially the solution of the ' dualism of the practical reason' put
forward tentatively in the concluding paragraphs of the Methods of
Ethics.
 % Without some datum beyond experience, he had written
in 1874, in the first edition, " the cosmos of Duty is reduced to a
Chaos ". The wording of these paragraphs was subjected to a good
deal of modification in successive editions, but to the end we find
him dwelling on " the vital need that our Practical Season feels of
proving or postulating this connexion of Virtue and self-interest, if it
is to be made consistent with itself" (sixth edition, p. 506), and the
position obviously bears a close resemblance to Kant's doctrine of
God as a postulate of the practical reason. Many would maintain,
as Dr. Eashdall, for example, has recently urged, that the supposed
dualism is entirely owing to Sidgwick's purely hedonistic conception
of the Good. If the pursuit of universal good is once recognised as
my reasonable duty, then the reasonableness of that duty cannot de-
pend on its turning out that my obedience has brought me personally
more pleasure than pain. "How can it be reasonable," says Dr.
Bashdall, " to take the point of view of the part when once the man
knows the existence of the whole, and admits that the whole is more
important than the part ? Must not the point of view of the whole
be the one and only reasonable point of view ? " (Theory of Good and
Evil, i., 56). While transcending egoistic hedonism through his
acceptance of the axiom of universal Benevolence, Sidgwick, in em-
phasising this dualism, harks back to the very position he had
abandoned. Having accepted the good of the whole as the only,
ultimately reasonable ethical end, he seems to turn round and refuse
to admit its reasonableness unless it can further justify itself as the
most pleasurable course for the individual. But this is to fail to
maintain himself at the ethical point of view. As a matter of fact,
the moral consciousness neither asks nor gets its wages in the he-
donistic currency: and the passages already quoted on " untheo-
logical morality " and the growth of the sympathetic feelings are
evidence that as time went on Sidgwidk himself was inclined to lay
less stress on this dualism and less stress therefore on the theistic
postulate, at least as conceived in Kant's sense and for Kant's pur-
poses. The theological or metaphysical postulate becomes rather
the belief in a moral order of the universe than belief in a Person
regulating that order. The two forms of expression are frequently
used by him alternately,1 and in a letter to J. A. Symonds, written
in 1886 at a time when he says his mind has been " obstinately and
latently occupied with the fundamental question of the relation of
morality," he says, " I tend to the view that the question of Per-
1
 E.g. in the passage quoted above (p. 347), or again (p. 560) where he
speaks, in 1898, of " the need of Theism—or at least some doctrine estab-
lishing the moral order of the world ".
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:sonality, the point on which the theist as such differs from the atheist,
is of no fundamental ethical importance. The question is what is
the order of the Cosmos, not whether it is a consciously planned
order" (p. 455).
There is another important point on which I think we may note
a change in Sidgwick's attitude in the later years of his life—I mean
the question of the nature of proof. He started with the old ideal
of "conclusions logically inferred from self-evident principles," but,
unconsciously influenced perhaps by the central Kantian idea of
' transcendental deduction'—proof from the possibility of experience
—and by the debates which arose round Mr. Balfour's Foundations
•of Belief, he refers in the concluding paragraph of the last edition
of the Methods to the analogy of physical science and suggests
(without absolutely committing himself to) the new criterion of the
truth of any propositions, " that they are indispensable to the sys-
tematic coherence of our beliefs". The same parallel is more
•elaborately drawn in a paper 'On the Nature of the Evidence for
Theism' read to the Synthetic Society in 1898 and printed as an
appendix to the Memoir. In this paper he definitely refuses to ad-
mit " that verification by particular experiences and cogent demon-
stration from incontrovertible premises are the only modes of
attaining the kind and degree of certitude which we require for a
working philosophy of religious belief". "The more we examine
the process of change in what is commonly accepted as knowledge,
the more we find that the notion of ' verification by experience '—
in the sense of ' verification by particular sense-perceptions'—is in-
adequate to explain or justify it. The criterion that we find really
decisive, in case after case, is not any particular new sense-perception
or group of 3ense-perceptions, but consistency with an elaborate and
complex system of beliefs, in which the results of an indefinite
number of perceptions and influences are combined." Hence he
concludes that "if we are led to accept Theism as being, more than
any other view of the Universe, consistent with, and calculated to
impart a clear consistency to, the whole body of what we commonly
agree to take for knowledge—including knowledge of right and
wrong—we accept it on grounds analogous to those on which im-
portant scientific conclusions have been accepted " (p. 607). In an
essay on ' Criteria of Truth and Error' (in MIND, January, 1900)
he reviewed the Cartesian and the Empirical Criterion as well as
Spencer's Universal Postulate, promising in a later article to deal
with the problem more positively. The outline of a lecture on the
Verification of Beliefs containing the substance of this unwritten
article is printed as an appendix to the volume on ' The Philosophy
of Kant and other Essays '. There we find him distinguishing three
modes of verification. (1) The Intuitive or Cartesian, (2) what he
calls the Discursive verification and (3) the Social or (Ecumenical
verification, most obviously illustrated by the consensus of experts.
The second of these is the appeal to ' system and coherence,' and
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Sidgwick concludes his sketch by saying : " I do not put these on a
par. Indeed, it will be evident from the very words used that the
second is of special and pre-eminent importance. For the ideal
aim of philosophy is systematisatiou—the exhibition of system and
coherence in a mass of beliefs which, as presented by Common
Sense, are wanting therein. But the special characteristic of my
philosophy," he somewhat curiously adds, "is to keep the import-
ance of the others in view." Such passages seem to me to indicate
an approximation on Sidgwick's part towards the general theory of
knowledge held by contemporary Idealism.
The contrast between Sidgwick and T. H. Green is a striking
study in temperamental differences. The contrast is suggested by
the reissue in separate form of Nettleship's Memoir, which has
hitherto been imbedded, and somewhat lost, in the Collected Works.
There are also some interesting references to Green in Sidgwick's
Memoir, notably the humorous account of Prof. Marshall's faith-
ful dealing with his friend: " He contrasted my lecture-room, in
which a handful of men are taking down what they regard as use-
ful for examination, with that of Green, in which a hundred men—
half of them B.A.'s—ignoring examinations, were wont to hang on
the lips of the man who was sincerely anxious to teach them the
truth about the universe and human life" (p. 394). In another
passage Sidgwick himself half-sorrowfully admits the element of
truth in this disadvantageous comparison : " I have been busy lately
reviewing Green's posthumous book—Prolegomena to Ethics. I read
it twice over carefully: the first time much impressed with its ethical
force and persuasiveness: the second time unable to resist the con-
viction that my intellect could not put it together into a coherent
whole—in fact that it would not do—and yet that probably it was
better that young men should be believers in it than in anything I
can teach them " (p. 380). " There is nothing in me of prophet or
apostle," he says again in a strain of self-depreciation. It was the
presence of this element in Green which made him the leader of a
school. Green's inspiration was more definitely religious than
Sidgwick's, in the sense in which religion and speculative thought
are one. Hence the intensity of feeling with which he grasped the
fundamental conception of his philosophy and laboured to impress
it on his generation. His intense feeling of the unity of the world
prevented him to some extent from realising the ambiguities of his
own formula, and they explain " the monotony and iteration " of
expression to which his biographer refers. In spite of Sidgwick's
preoccupation with the theistic problem, his interest in the universe
was a more purely intellectual one and he lacked the overmastering
speculative impulse which lies at the root of all philosophical
systems. " As to the riddle of the Universe," he says, " I never
had the presumption to hope that its solution was reserved for me,
though I had to try." This is not the spirit in which knight after
knight has ridden out to take " the dark tower ". The words may
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be contrasted with an utterance of Green towards the close of his
life : " I thought I had got hold of a key which I find now will not
unlock so much as I fancied it would. But I must make a push
now, or I shall leave the world with nothing done." Not so dif-
ferent in mood, the two sayings yet reflect strikingly the different
starting-points and methods of the two writers. In the vital interests
of philosophy it is no doubt better to embrace a supreme hypothesis
like Green, even though the formula should on closer examination
prove lacking and require much re-casting. This is what has
happened in the subsequent history of Idealism in England, but it
is a great thing to supply a generation with a principle by whose
aid it may unify its moral and intellectual life. Sidgwick was con-
stitutionally incapable of playing such a part. At a meeting of the
Psychical Society, in whose investigations he was so deeply interested,
he describes himself as " pouring cold water in a lucid and impartial
manner" on more than nine-tenths of the experiences brought for-
ward. Something of the same paralysing effect was produced by
the keen play of his critical faculty on the systematic attempts of
contemporary philosophy. But the lesson of scrupulous intellectual
honesty is one no less important to be learned; and while acknow-
ledging the weakness associated with the critical nature, Sidgwick
rightly claims it as the source of his strength. As he puts it
modestly in his delicately balanced way: " Certainly I find my self-
criticism an obstacle to energetic and spirited work, but on the othei
hand I feel that whatever value my work has is due to it". Philo-
sophy has need of both temperaments and uses both to help her on
her way.
A. SETH PRINGUB-PATTISON.
The Philosophical Badicals, and other Essays ; together with Chap-
ters Reprinted on the Philosophy of Religion in Kant and
Hegel. By A. SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON, LL.D., Fellow of the
British Academy, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the
University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh and London: William
Blackwood & Sons. Pp. x, 336.
THE volume before us contains a collection of Essays and Reviews
which have appeared in various magazines during the last few years,
together with two important papers reproduced from books which
have long been out of print. All the writings here brought together
are well worth republication in their present form; and there is no
need to add that in every case their literary form is marked by a
brilliancy, clearness, and force reminding one of the philosophical
work of a century or a century and a half ago, when the men who
wrote on these subjects for English readers were men who could
both write and think in English.
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